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Summary  findings
Using a large cross-country data set, Commander,  As for how government size affects growth, they find a
Elavoodi, and Lee examine the factors that cause  robust and significant negative relationship between
governments to grow and analyze how the size of  growth and government size, as measured by
government affects growth, whether measured as income  consumption. Policy distortions, predictably, also have a
growth or other measures of well-being, such as infant  negative effect on growth. But the positive effects of
rnortality and life expectancy.  well-functioning institutions and high quality in
They find no robust link between government size and  government bureaucracies can offset the negative
per capita income. The factors they find to be important  influence of large government size alone.
in explaining government size are relative prices, the age-  Finally, they find that social-sector spending can exert
dependency ratio, how long a country has been  a positive influence by reducing infant mortality and
in  dependent, relative political freedom, and openness in  raising life expectancy. Better income distribution, higher
trade. Their results also partially support the view that  per capita income, higher per capita income growth, and
governments use consumption to buffer external risk,  more political freedom have the same positive effect on
especially in low-income countries.  those two measures of well-being.
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This paper uses a large cross country data set to look at the factors explaining the size of
government and the consequences  of government for  income growth and other measures of well-
being, such as infant mortality and life expectancy. We find no robust link between  government size
and per  capita income. Relative prices, the age dependency ratio, years of independence, political
freedom and openness are found to be important explanatory factors behind growth in government.
Our results partially support  the view that  governments use consumption to buffer external  risk,
particularly in low income countries. With respect to the consequences  of government for growth, we
find a  robust  negative association with  government consumption and  with  an  index of  policy
distortions and a positive relationship with quality of bureaucracy.  Finally, we find that social sector
spending  can exert a positive  influence  on infant mortality and  life expectancy.
JEL classification:  047, Hil  1, I31
21. Introduction
In recent years work on the determinants  of cross-country  growth has burgeoned.
Several regularities  have emerged from this research. Investment in both physical and
human capital, as measured by educational attainment, stable macroeconomic  policies
combined with more open trade regimes, as well as better developed  financial  markets,
have all been found to exert a positive effect on growth. Conversely,  population  growth,
political instability, budget deficits, terms of trade shocks and associated  volatility, as
well as policy distortions -- such as the use of over-valued exchange rates -- tend to hold
back growth.
In all this work one of the major outstanding  questions  relates to the consequences
of government  for performance.  This is obviously  a critical  area given the widespread  and
significant expansion in  the  size of  government in  both  industrial and  developing
countries  over the last fifty years. In the Solow framework,  a shift in government  activity
would be represented as a shift in the production function.  In models of endogenous
growth absent diminishing  returns,  government  activity  that affect  technology  could also
affect growth. Thus, fiscal policy could influence  the long run equilibrium  growth path
through the productivity  of government spending. Yet much obviously depends on the
activities performed by goverm.ient.  If government is assumed to provide only public
goods, such provision  can be shown to exert a positive effect on the marginal product of
capital and the economy  can benefit from greater  scale. The taxation used to finance  those
goods will tend to exert a negative influence. As a consequence,  the relation between
government  size and growth will be inverse  U-shaped,  with that shape determined  by the
3conflicting effects of public goods provision and distortionary  taxation at various levels
of government  size. Moreover,  public goods will tend to be subject to excess demand  if
no mechanism  -- such as a production  tax -- exists  to offset such congestion V
The  public goods model  of  government provides a  useful  benchmark for
predicting  the consequences  of types of government  activity.  This is clearly useful given
that governments  characteristically  do not restrict themselves  to providing  public goods.
Yet, empirical tests for the effects of government have proven far from conclusive.
Earlier work with cross country  data sets, for example,  has found not even marginal and
average tax  rates to  be  important explanatory factors behind comparative growth
experiences,  in part perhaps  because of covariation  with income,  measurement  problems
2 and the lagged effects of taxation  . The evidence suggests that public spending on
infrastructure3  and the provision  of a stable and predictable  environment  for transactions
act positively on growth while government  consumption  tends to act negatively  4.  The
latter result is generally  explained by the fact that govermnent consumption will not
directly affect productivity nor enter private agents' production functions.  Even if it
affects productivity, its benefits at the margin fall short of the costs of distortionary
taxation needed to finance it.  However,  this association  may not be that robust, given
I See Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995).
2 Easterly  and Rebelo  (1993).
3For  example,  Aschauer  (1989) and Hulten  (1996). See also,  Pritchett  (1996) for an alternative  view and
Devarajan,Swaroop  and Zou (1996) for contrary  evidence.
See,  Landau  (1986),  Barro  (1991) and (1996b),  and Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1995).
4that government  size may  be a proxy for other factors,  such as a fiscal deficit,  lack of data
on marginal  tax rates or the gap between  domestic  and international  prices ".
While the ambiguity found in the empirical literature may be a function of the
difficulty in  identifying government activity, complete measures of  government are
difficult  to implement,  given the pervasive  influence  of non-fiscal  policies  as well as data
limitations. Certainly,  it appears  that it is combinations  of policies that matter and these
combinations  can include interventions  in price setting and trade policy. To complicate
matters further, institutional factors, such as the integrity of the judicial system, are
increasingly recognised as mattering for growth. These factors themselves cannot be
dissociated from the actions of government,  signalling the importance of using better
measures  of government  that capture  not only size but also the scope  of government.
This  paper revisits the  question of  the  consequences of  different types of
government  activity for growth  using a large cross-country  data set. But prior to that, the
paper starts by  asking an  equally fundamental question; what factors account for
differences in the size of government over time and place ?  Having looked at the
determinants  of government  size, we try to measure the scope of non-fiscal government
activity as well as get a measure of the quality of government.  We then ask what the
consequences  of both government  size and these other variables capturing  the scope and
quality of government  have been for outcomes,  such as growth in per capita income and
measures  of well-being,  such as infant mortality  and life expectancy  ?
sBosworth,  Collins and Chen (1996).
5In addressing  these questions,  the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 gives a
brief description of the data that are used and clarifies a number of basic measurement
issues relating to both the size and scope of government.  Section 3 then provides an
overview of trends in  government size in both  industrial and developing countries,
including changes in the composition  of government  expenditures  over time. Section 4
considers the factors driving the expansion  in government size. It reports the results of
our cross-country  regressions looking at the determinants of government size using a
variety  of specifications.  Section  5  turns to a detailed investigation  of the consequences  of
government size and scope for growth in per capita income. Section 6 continues by
looking at how government  affects other measures of welfare or well-being, such as
infant mortality and life expectancy. Section 7 looks at how robust our individual
estimates  are by running the size, growth and the well-being  equations  in a system and,
subsequently,  by analysing  the sensitivity  of our results to potential  measurement  errors
and specification  of our estimated  models.  Section 8 concludes.
2.  Data and Measurement
The paper is based on results from a large, cross-country panel data set that covers
the period 1964 to  1993 and encompasses information on up to  132 countries. The data
have been drawn from both the World Bank and the Summers-Heston World Tables. A
full  list of  variables  and  their  source  is  given  in  Appendix  1.  The  data  cover  the
maximum  period  for  which  information  is available  for  a  wide  range  of  developing
countries and which also corresponds, in many cases, with independence from colonial
6rule. Country  coverage  is given in Appendix  2. The data have  been pooled  so as to exploit
the information  in ten year averages  with those averages  covering 1964-73,  1974-83  and
1984-93.
The measure of government  and the choice of deflators is clearly critical.  One
common measure of government size is the ratio of government expenditure  to total
expenditures or  output as  approximated  by  GDP.  But the  data are  generally not
comprehensive,  with coverage of public enterprises -- an important expenditure  item in
many developing countries -- being particularly inadequate. In addition, this measure
tends to ignore important  off-budget  items, such as tax concessions. Further, we need to
distinguish  between two basic components  of government  expenditure;  consumption  and
investment. In the latter case, investment  numbers disaggregated  by public and private
components are,  when available, limited in  coverage. Also  definitions of  public
investment  can differ and comparable  deflators  to the Summers-Heston  are not available.
As a consequence  we rely on an aggregate  measure of physical investment. For current
expenditures,  we could include  transfers, such as pensions  or social security benefits.  But
such transfers  only redistribute  resources  whereas  non-transfer  or exhaustive  expenditures
require real resources. Government consumption -- mostly comprising government's
wage bill -- may provide  a narrower  but more precise indicator  of the current benefits for
6 consumers  from government  spending
6 An alternative which avoids problems in measuring output is to use govemment employment, but this too
has drawbacks, such as ignoring changes in labor productivity or substitution between inputs; see
Lindauer (1988) and Gemmell (1993)
7As we are mainly interested in looking at how the division of output across public
and  private  goods  affects  performance,  we  work  with  data  on  real  government
consumption and real aggregate physical investment. These are expressed as fractions of
GDP  and  are  taken  from  the  Summers-Heston  data  set.  These  data  are  based  on
international  prices  or  purchasing  power  parity  values  and  facilitate  cross-country
comparisons  over  time.  The transformation  to  international prices  is  not  innocuous.
Using  national prices to  get real  expenditure ratios gives  quite  significantly  different
measures of govermrnent size -- as indicated by Table I  -- particularly for low income
countries  with  a  large  non-tradable  sector  and  large  labour  intensive  components  in
government  consumption.  For these  countries,  using  international prices  rather  than
deflating by constant 1987 US dollar values increases the government consumption ratio
substantially.
These size measures obviously only capture the fiscal actions of government.  But
governments  also  provide a  key  component  of  the  overall  institutional  environment,
encompassing the rule of law, the protection of property rights and the effectiveness of its
bureaucracy. Such institutions set the rules of the game for the players in an economy and
are hence critical in determining the ability of any private sector to function effectively.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the consequences of stable property regimes can
be  very  significant,  possibly  equivalent  in  magnitude  to  the  effect  of  education  in
determining growth '.  Similarly, surveys of entrepreneurs in developing  countries that
have looked at the effects of instability -- where rules themselves are subject to frequent
Keefer and Knack (1995).
8Table I  Average Government Size By Region"
Government Consumption/GDP  in %b  Observations
1985  International  1987  US dollars
_____________________________Prices
All Countries
1964-73  16.5  13.8  93
1974-83  18.4  15.5  113
1984-93  19.1  16.2  124
High Income OECD
1964-73  13.4  16.9  22
1974-83  14.3  17.8  22
1984-93  14.3  17.7  22
All Developing Countries
1964-73  17.5  12.5  67
1974-83  19.8  14.7  82
1984-93  20.6  15.6  93
Sub-Saharan Africa
1964-73  19.9  13.1  29
1974-83  23.1  15.3  33
1984-93  25.5  17.4  38
Latin America and Carribean
1964-73  14.2  10.5  20
1974-83  16.6  13.0  24
1984-93  17.7  13.7  26
East Asia and Pacific
1964-73  16.0  15.4  10
1974-83  18.2  16.8  12
1984-93  16.3  14.6  14
South Asia
1964-73  21.9  11.0  3
1974-83  19.6  9.7  3
1984-93  22.5  - 11.2  3
Middle East and North Africa
1964-73  19.4  16.4  4
1974-83  20.3  19.5  10
1984-93  21.0  20.5  11
Europe and Central Asia
1964-73  15.0  13.7  5
1974-83  12.0  11.2  7
1984-93  11.4  12.0  8
Source:  PWT5.6  and World  Bank
b Govemment  size  in 1985  intemational  prices  only available  up to 1992;  unless  otherwise  noted,  all regional
breakdowns  exclude  high income  countries;  E. Asia  and Pacific  includes  high  income  countries  that are not
OECD;  Middle  East and  North Africa  includes  one high income  country.
9changes as also cases where rules may be stable but government agents have much
discretion  -- show, not surprisingly,  that stability  and transparency  in the legal and policy-
8 making  environment  is key for private  sector  decisions
Aside from the presence  of stable rules,  the direct efficiency  of governments,  such
as the perceived presence of corruption among civil servants and politicians and the
extent of red tape have been shown to have clear consequences  for performance  9. For
instance,  bureaucratic  inefficiencies  generally  raise transaction costs, while the integrity
and efficiency of the judicial system will have an impact on the ability to  resolve
contractual and other disagreements,  with low efficiency leading to higher uncertainty.
Corruption generally results in lowering private investment and ultimately growth by
reducing  private returns  to investment  through  this implicit  tax.
To get  a  fuller appreciation of  the consequences of government, we further
consider  a range of other measures  that capture  the broader  interventions  of government.
First, drawing on earlier work by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1993), among
others, we include an explicit  evaluation  of the quality of government  as given primarily
by its bureaucracy.  This evaluation is put together from a set of responses  by foreign
investors  that focus on the extent of red tape involved  in any transaction,  the regulatory
environment  and the degree of autonomy  from political pressure. While responses on
foreign  investors' are likely  to be biased,  these series  provide the only currently  available
large-scale cross-country evaluations of the way in which government bureaucracies
SBorner,  Brunetti  and Weder  (1994).
9Mauro  (1993), Keefer and Knack (1995), Clague et al (1996).
10function. These responses provide us  with  a  composite index of  the  quality  of
government  bureaucracy  or its capability. The manner of its construction  is spelled  out in
Appendix 1. Second,  we summarise  governments'  policy stance over time again through
an index  that combines  three key indicators;  the degree  to which an economy  is open -- as
measured  by the share of trade in GDP -- the degree to which a country's exchange  rate
has been over-valued  -- as measured  by the black market premium  on the exchange  rate --
and the degree  to which local prices  have departed  from international  prices. Details  as to
the construction  of the index are again given  in Appendix 1.
3. Growth  of Government
Government  size has grown throughout  this century  but the most dramatic  part of
this expansion  has been since 1945. Aside from greater public  provision  of infrastructure,
utilities, education  and health services,  there was also a clear shift toward greater direct
control over production.  In the industrial economies,  large-scale  transfer programmes  --
such as unemployment  benefits -- were established.  For example, in the major countries
of Western Europe, government expenditure  which had on average only accounted for
around 10%  of GDP in 1870,  accounted  for some 30% in 1960 and over 50% by 1995 '°
While long run data from the industrial economies suggest that wars have tended to
10  These are nominal  ratios of total govermnent  expenditure  to GDP.  Government  expenditure  includes
central  and local  governments  and  the  social  security  sector.  Tanzi  and Schuknect  (1995);  World
Bank (1997).
11ratchet up government size  ,it  is remarkable that most of the expansion post-1945 has
occurred in peacetime.
This  growth  in  the  industrial  economies  has  been  echoed  in  much  of  the
developing  world.  At  the  start  of  the  1960s,  government  expenditure  on  average
12-I90thshdsitdt
accounted for little over 15 % of GDP  . At the peak in the mid-i980s  this had shifted to
over 30% of GDP, before declining to around 26% in the mid-1990s. Part of the growth
post-1960 can be attributed to state-building in the aftermath of colonialism, but also to
movements in international commodity markets.
This  widespread growth  in  government  has  also  been accompanied  by  major
changes in the composition of expenditures. In the industrial economies between 1945-
1970 much of the increase in government size was driven by increases in transfers and
subsidies.  After 1970 growth in interest payments has predominated.  By the early 1990s
the share of spending allocated to traditional public goods -- such as defence,  law and
order  -- had shrunk to no more than  10 percent of general  government outlays  in the
major industrial economies, while over half the resources diverted to government through
taxation  were  transferred  to  specific  beneficiaries.  Despite  efforts  to  reduce  fiscal
imbalances,  including  cuts  in  government  consumption  and  transfer programmes,  the
persistence in government size in the industrial economies is striking.
Peacock  and Wiseman  (1961).
12  These are nominal  ratios of total  government  expenditure  to GDP. Government  expenditure  includes
central  govermment  expenditure  only. See World  Bank (1997).
12In  developing countries, both government consumption and investment have
tended to  decline since the  1970s. Even so, by the  1990s government consumption
continued to account  for around 40% of total expenditure  in developing  countries  and in
Africa such outlays account for over half of total government spending. The share of
transfers and subsidies has remained very much more restricted than in the  OECD
economies  and has generally  remained quite stable, except in Latin America where we
observe  a clear increase. Interest  payments  have climbed  very significantly  in all regions.
4. Explaining  Government  Size
What accounts for government size ? What have been the drivers behind this
substantial  growth in government  in almost  all regions ?  In this section, we first survey
the empirical  literature  before proceeding  to our own estimations  using the panel data set.
Explaining government size  confronts major problems of  endogeneity and
causality.  For example,  it is widely  held that urbanisation  has been one of the factors  that
has sponsored growth in government.  Yet it would be quite reasonable to argue that
urbanisation itself is in part a response to government,  with citizens moving to urban
areas where government  and other services  are more available. Equally, a common, but
mechanical, explanation  relates government size to  the level of income. This simple
association  -- often  termed,  Wagner's Law -- has government  growing  relative to national
income with the correlation between growth in government  size and per capita income
being largely driven by demand  factors. In the original formulation,  it was hypothesised
that industrialisation  would lead to growth  in demand for income elastic services, while
13the greater complexity of an industrialised  economy would require a  larger role for
government.
Empirical tests of this relationship  have, however, proven largely inconclusive
and certainly  sensitive  to the selection  of deflators. While Easterly  and Rebelo  (1993) for
a  wide range of  countries, and Oxley (1994) for Great Britain 13, find that either
government  revenue or expenditure  to GDP rises with per capita income in both cross-
section and time series estimations,  Ram (1987) only very weakly replicates this result
when using time series data for 115 countries  to determine the elasticity  of government
size with respect to per capita GDP  . Positive elasticities dominate  but only slightly.
Further,  on the cross-section  data, the estimations  -- using constant international  prices to
avoid relative  price bias -- suggest  that, if anything,  the government  share  of GDP falls as
incomes  rises.
While the original  argument  was that the public sector would  expand both  through
the action of income -- as luxury consumption  -- and through structural change -- the
greater  complexity  of public  tasks associated  with an industrialising  economy  -- this
lumps all government spending types together and, particularly in the recent period,
ignores the  fact that  technical change might actually reduce the  need  for public
3 Oxley  (1994) uses data for Great Britain  in the period 1870-1913  and finds strong  support  for a long  run
relationship  between  the government  share and  real or nominal  income.  Granger  causality  appears  to
run from income  to public  expenditure.
Easterly  and Rebelo  (1993) use nominal  government  revenue  to GDP, Oxley  (1994)  uses nominal  and
real government  expenditure  to GDP  and Ram  (1987) uses data on govermnent  consumption  to GDP
in 1975  intemational  prices.
14intervention  15,  Consequently, it may not be the case that all public services have income
elasticities greater than unity.  Further, this will depend not only on income growth but
also changes in the relative prices of public and private goods.  Courakis et al (1993)
using time series  data for Greece and Portugal distinguish between the components of
16 public expenditure, namely transfers, consumption and investment  . They relate these
shares to  relative  prices  of  public  expenditure, permanent  income,  population  and  a
nominal demand variable and find significant differences in responses across expenditure
types.  They  find that  income  elasticities  greater than  unity  only  hold  in  the  case of
transfer  expenditures  in  Greece  and  consumption  expenditures  in  Portugal.  For
investment outlays income elasticities were no different from unity. Relative prices were
found  to  have  a  negative  influence  on  various  components  of  public  expenditure
particularly  for  government consumption  in  Greece. The  importance  of  including  the
relative price  of  government goods and  services has  always  been noted  in studies  of
demand for public goods (e.g., the median voter model) in the public finance and public
choice literature  17*  To our knowledge, our paper is the first that includes such a relative
18 price term as a determinant of government size for a large cross-country data set
15Think, for example,  of telecommunications  where  technological  change  has shifted  parts of the industry
away from natural  monopoly,  facilitating  multiple  provision  and changing  with it the regulatory
functions  of government.
16 This approach,  of course,  requires  appropriate  deflators,  something  lacking  for most developing
countries  and which  effectively  stops  us from systematically  separating  out the components  of public
spending.
7 Borcherding  and Deacon  (1972),  Buchanan  (1977),  Borcherding  (1985),  Mueller  (1989).
18 See also, Lybeck  (1986) which  concentrates  on 12 OECD  countries.
15The  likely  variation  in  the  sensitivity  of  different  components  of  public
expenditure  to  income and  other deterninants  also  signals the  importance of political
economy considerations.  For instance, on the assumption that govermments tailor their
expenditures to the demands of the median voter, an extension of voting rights will shift
the position of the median voter in the income distribution. This will imply a likely shift
toward voters at the lower end of the income and wealth spectrum, possibly raising the
demand for redistributive policies and hence for taxation  . An implication would be that
democratic regimes will tend to have larger governments.
The substantial  growth in transfer programmes  in the industrial  economies  that
was highlighted  in Section 3, has to  be related to a constellation  of political  economy
factors. Most generally, we can think of such redistributive programmes being motivated
by  ideological  preferences.  Certainly,  the  provision  of  welfare  supports  to  those
experiencing  transitory  income  fluctuations, as  well  as to  the  elderly  and  \  llnerable
groups,  was  a  comer  stone  of  the  post-1945  consensus  in  Western  Europe.  The
preferences embodied in this consensus in due course spilled over to many developing
countries, albeit constrained by the lower level of resources to be redistributed.  Probably
the clearest link may run from the population structure and the age dependency ratio, in
particular, to the demand for pensions.  However, as our empirical work concentrates on
real resource use -- and hence on consumption and investment -- we do not  explicitly
focus  on the  factors driving redistributive  choices. Nevertheless,  transfer programmes
Meltzer and Richard (1981).
16will  not  be  neutral  with  respect to  the  size of  government  consumption  as they  will
obviously tend to be linked with a larger administrative apparatus and there will be strong
collinearity between consumption and redistribution.
Finally,  another body of work has emphasised that the size of government  will
also depend on the extent of risk facing agents and the response of government to risk.
This approach largely picks up from the empirical finding that economies that are more
open tend to have larger govemments 20 (Cameron, 1978). At one level, this relationship
seems hard to explain, as openness would likely be associated with greater competition
and less scope for government. Yet if openness raises the vulnerability of an economy,
governments may feel bound to weaken the consequences by raising the size of the public
sector and put in place policies that smooth such fluctuations. Indeed, it has also been
argued  that  the  adoption  of  such  stabilisation  policies  were  themselves  a  possible
precondition for voters to accept trade opening and higher vulnerability. If this is the case,
then openness would itself be endogenous and a fimction of at least some components of
government spending 2.  Rodrik (1996) has a rather different emphasis in arguing that
there is not  only  a positive partial correlation between openness and  size but  that the
causality is from openness to size. Openness in an earlier period -- in this case the early
1960s -- is a statistically significant predictor of the subsequent change in government
consumption.  He links this  to risk, as measured by both openness and volatility  in the
terms of trade, and argues that government consumption has been used to reduce income
20 Cameron  (1978).
21 A point made by Slemrod (1995).
17volatility. As such, governments will be larger in terms of consumption in countries
experiencing  larger amounts of external  risk and that controlling for risk, openness  will
not exert  an independent  effect  on government  consumption.
4.1.  Empirical results
We now turn to our large cross-country data set to explore more systematically
the factors accounting for government size over the period 1964-1993. Our approach is to
relate  government  size  measured  as  government  consumption  relative  to  GDP  and
expressed in 1985 international  prices to a set of determining  variables.  The data are
pooled with ten year averages  with coverage of  131 countries. We report sequentially
results from the OLS and IV estimations. Later we turn to 3SLS estimation.
In the light of the discussion above, we include on the right hand side; a per capita
income variable; a relative price term, given as the ratio of the government consumption
price deflator to the private consumption deflator; several demographic variables -- the
urbanisation rate and the age dependency ratio; an openness variable defined as total trade
normalised by GDP; a terms of trade variable to capture the price component of external
risk and measured, as we shall see, in a number of ways; a variable summarising the years
since a country has been independent -- to test for any nation-building effects associated
with independence; a federal dummy to control for the federal form of government; and a
measure of political freedom. The latter is the political freedom component of the Gastil
index and is used to test for the positive impact of democracy on government size which
presumably  works  through  the  median  voter  model.  Finally,  decade  and  regional
18dummies  are also inserted in the regressions. Results are presented  in Table  2 for OLS
and IV estimations. The instruments  in the IV regression  are the average  of  the previous
five year lags of each endogenous  variable. (see footnotes  to Table 2). These are valid
instruments as the correlations  between residuals across decades are almost zero. We
instrument  for per capita GDP, relative price of government  consumption,  openness,  and
political  freedom. The OLS  and IV estimates  yield very comparable  coefficients.
The main conclusions  from Table  2 are as follows.  We find no robust support for
22 Wagner's Law  . When we control for relative prices, the coefficient  on the per capita
income term is indeed positive but it is both small and insignificant.  As expected, the
relative price term enters negatively and very significantly. Real public expenditures
could be expected to depend on their relative price and this indeed proves to be an
important explanatory factor. With regard to  the demographic  variables, we find that
urbanisation exerts  no  notable influence, the  coefficient is  in  fact  negative and
insignificant.  By  contrast, the  age  dependency ratio  enters  positively and  very
significantly. Testing for the  effects of  nation-building among newly independent
countries, the  years  of  independence variable enters  negatively and  significantly,
indicating that  countries with shorter periods of  independence tend to  have larger
governments.  This gives some support to the nation-building  hypothesis. The political
freedoms variable --  included to  see  whether greater democratisation tends to  be
associated  with larger government  through  increased  demands  for public  spending --
22  A simple  correlation  of government  consumption  to GDP  to per  capita  income  is, however,  negative  and
significant  at the I percent  level.
19Table 2 Government Size Regressions:  OLS and Instrumental Variable"
(Dependent  Variable:  Government  Consumption/GDP  in 1985  International  Prices)
Independent Variables  OLS  OLS  IV,  IV
Constant  -1.242***  -1.332***  -1.248***  -1.212***
(0.334)  (0.341)  (0.387)  . (0.379)
Dummy  for 1974-83  0.061  0.062  0.077*  0.082**
(0.043)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.041)
Dummyfor  1984-93  0.109**  0.116***  0.131***  0.142***
(0.043)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.043)
Per Capita GDP  0.050  0.051  0.055  0.048
(0.042)  (0.042)  (0.046)  (0.045)
Age Dependency Ratio  0.446***  0.458***  0.461***  0.467***
(0.131)  (0.131)  (0.135)  (0.135)
Urbanization Ratio  -0.034  -0.024  -0.044  -0.032
(0.039)  (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.044)
Relative Price of Government Consumption  -0.644***  -0.644***  -0.730***  -0.724***
(0.060)  (0.060)  (0.085)  (0.086)
Openness  0.137***  0.115***  0.135***  0.100***
(0.031)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.038)
Terms of Trade Changes (TOT)  -0.534  -1.870**  -0.533  -2.228**
(.475)  (0.735)  (.516)  (0.866)
Openness*TOT  -2.074***  -2.516***
(0.792)  (0.876)
Years Since Independence  -0.103*  -0.099*  -0.090  -0.091
(0.057)  (0.057)  (0.060)  (0.059)
Political Freedom (Ihigh, 7 Low)  -0.031***  -0.028**  -0.025*  -0.026*
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.014)
Federal Dummy  -0.055  -0.063  -0.043  -0.058
(0.045)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.043)
Latin America Dummy  -0.189***  -0.193***  -0.189***  -0.192***
(0.051)  (0.050)  (0.056)  (0.055)
East Asia Dummy  -0.285***  -0.292***  -0.312***  -0.315***
(0.041)  (0.040)  (0.050)  (0.048)
Number of Observations  357  357  345  345
R-squared'  0.5674  0.5764  0.5348  0.5473
*n*  significant  at 1%  level  ** significant  at 5% level  * significant  at 10%  level
'Standard errors,  corrected  for heteroscedasticity,  are in parentheses.
b For the IV regressions  in Table  2,  the instruments  for the following  variables  are the previous  five year lag of itself
and regional  and decade  dummy  variables:  per capita  GDP; relative  price  of government  consumption;  openness;
and political  freedom.  All  other  variables  in the regression  were  treated  as exogenous.
The  R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with instrumental  variable  regressions.
20enters negatively and significantly. This indicates that countries with fewer political
freedoms  indeed  tend to have smaller governments.  The coefficients  on decade dummies
indicate that government  size increased  over the periods.  The dummy for countries  with
federal systems indicates that these are predictably associated with a  smaller central
government  but the coefficient  is not significant.  Finally, we also experimented  with a
variable  that carried information  on whether or not a country  has been at war -- civil and
otherwise.  We found that neither  type of war was an important  explanatory  factor driving
govemment  size and the variable  was duly omitted.
4.2. Government  Size and External  Risk
How much of government  size can be attributed to risk aversion as government
programmes  attempt to mitigate  the risk associated  with greater openness and/or greater
volatility  or changes in the terms of trade ? As indicated  above, we have explicitly  tested
for the effect of openness  and indeed find that openness is positively and significantly
correlated with government size. But openness is obviously only one component of
external risk. A complete  measure of risk would include price changes  and would  hence
include some  measure of the terms of trade changes. One approach  is to use the standard
deviation  in the terms of trade as the usual measure of income volatility. Alternatively,
one could simply apply a variable for the change in the terms of trade. Below we
experiment  with both.
We see that with openness and the volatility term in the estimating equation
(Table 3, Panel A), both enter with the predicated  sign  but only openness  is significant.
21Table 3  Government  Size and  External  Risk: OLS and  Instrumental  Variable  Regressionsa
(Dependent Variable: Government Consumption/GDP in 1985 International Prices)
Panel A
Independent  Variables  OLS  OLS  IVb  IV
Openness  0.152***  0.044  0.157***  0.049
(0.033)  (0.049)  (0.037)  (0.051)
Volatility in Terms of Trade  -0.050  0.539  -0.204  0.438
(.249)  (0.345)  (.249)  (0.368)
Openness*STOT  0.973***  1.017***
(0.344)  (0.389)
Nunber of Observations  348  348  336  336
R-squared'  0.5614  0.5696  0.5308  0.5388
Panel B
Independent  Variables  OLS  OLS  IV  IV
Openness  0.135***  0.077*  0.132***  0.068
(0.031)  (0.042)  (0.036)  (0.045)
Terns  of Trade Increases (TOTI)  0.234  -1.788**  0.246  -2.068**
(.580)  (0.896)  (.615)  (1.013)
Terns  of Trade Decreases  -2.537*  -2.469  -2.472*  -2.471
(1.380)  (2.247)  (1.483)  (2.839)
Openness & TOTI  -3.141***  -3.280***
(0.939)  (1.038)
Openness & TOTD  0.103  -0.243
(2.202)  (2.738)
Nunber of Observations  357  357  345  345
R-squared  0.5716  0.5831  0.5389  0.5525
**  significant  at 1%  level  significant  at 5% level  * significant  at 10% level
' Standard  errors,  corrected  for heteroscedasticity,  are in parentheses.  Coefficients  on the other  regressors  are not
shown. Other  regressors  are the same  as those listed  in  Table 2.
b For all IV  regressions  in Table  3, the instruments  for  the following  variables  are the previous  five  year lag of itself
and regional  and decade  dummy  variables:  per capita  GDP;  relative  price of government  consumption;  openness;
and political  freedom.  All other  variables  in the regression  were treated  as exogenous.
'The  R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with instrumental  variable  regressions.
22Introducing  an interaction  term of openness  and terms of trade volatility yields a highly
significant  -- at the 1 percent  level -- and positive  coefficient  on the interaction  term. Both
the openness  and terms of trade volatility  variables lose all significance.  This appears  to
be consistent  with Rodrik's (1996) finding  that the dominant  channel  is through  terms of
trade risk.
If the underlying motivation of  governments and one that drives the public
consumption  decision is to reduce risk then it can be argued  that there will be asymmetry
in responses  to positive  and negative  shocks.  The terms of trade volatility  by construction
cannot distinguish between upside (positive) from downside (negative) risks.  In
particular, we could expect that to mitigate  downside  risk adverse shifts in the terms of
trade would be met by raising  or, at the least, maintaining  the size of government.  To test
for this explicitly we add two terms of trade variables to the size regression;  one giving
the size of a terms of trade increase and the  other the  size of a  decrease. For the
asymmetry conjecture to  hold, we would expect that coefficients on  increases and
decreases be unequal, inversely signed with a negative coefficient  on decreases in the
terms of trade that is larger in absolute value than the coefficient  on the increases  in the
terms of trade. We find that, controlling for openness,  this is indeed the case (Table 3,
Panel  B).  There  appears to  be  clear  counter-cyclical behaviour  with  countries
experiencing  an adverse  shift in their terms of trade tending to have larger governments.
However,  only the adverse  terms of trade variable is significant  at the 10 percent level.
When we include the interaction  between openness  and the two terms of trade variables,
23we still find that countries  that are more open and experience  an adverse  terrns of trade
shock tend to have a larger  government.
These results are effectively  replicated  when simply  using a single variable  for the
change  in the terms of trade (Table 2). The coefficient  is negative  but not significant.  But
when we  introduce an  interaction term for  openness and the  terms of  trade, the
coefficients on  the openness, terms of trade and interaction term all  remain highly
significant. In  this  case, openness appears to  exert a  clear independent effect on
government  size even  when we control  for external  risk.
While in the regressions  we control for income and hence lower the risk that the
terms of trade proxies for low income levels, we now explicily look at whether the
coefficients  for different groups of countries  classified by income levels would be the
same in  the  government size regression. We  report the coefficients from separate
estimations  by income categories  for the specific  variables of interest,  namely openness,
the terms of trade or the volatility  term specification,  and the interaction  term in each
instance. Table 4  summarises  our results. When we include the change in the terms of
trade, we find significant  differences  across  income levels. Controlling  for openness,  the
high income countries  have  a positive  but insignificant  coefficient  on the interaction  term
suggesting that government does not stabilise in terms of public consumption.  By
contrast, for both middle and low income economies  -- and particularly  the latter where
the interaction  term is very significant -- we find evidence that governments  do adopt
stabilising  policies  in response  to external  risk.  Note, of course,  that such counter-cyclical
responses may of course be perfectly consistent  with a destabilising  policy in terms of
growth. This would  hold if in response  to an adverse shock,  the rise in government
24Table 4  Government Size and External Risk by Income Groups:  OLS and Instrumental Variables Regressions'
(Dependent Variable: Government Consumption/GDP in 1985 International Prices)
Panel  A  High Income  High Income  Middle  Income  Middle  Income  Low Income  Low Income
Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries
Independent  Variables  OLS  IVb  OLS  IV  OLS  IV
Openness  0.130*  0.051  0.204**  0.237***  0.147***  0.106
(0.067)  (0.067)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.054)  (0.070)
Terms of Trade Changes (TOT)  1.650  1.087  -1.965*  -2.364  -1.294  -1.201
(2.009)  (2.804)  (1.106)  (1.444)  (0.881)  (1.020)
Openness*TOT  1.445  1.723  -1.006  -1.307  -1.992**  -2.112**
(1.728)  (2.834)  (1.248)  (1.532)  (0.937)  (0.933)
Number of Observations  74  73  154  145  129  127
R-squared'  0.6844  0.5763  0.558  0.5548  0.5146  0.4317
Panel  B  High Income  High Income  Middle  Income  Middle  Income  Low Income  Low Income
Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries
Independent  Variables  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV
Openness  0.121  0.066  0.140  0.214**  -0.037  -0.093
(0.086)  (0.087)  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.081)  (0.094)
Volatility in Terms of Trade (STOT)  -3.478***  -4.035***  0.434  -0.89  1.497***  1.751***
(1.165)  (1.026)  (0.482)  (0.544)  (0.563)  (0.630)
Openness*STOT  -0.031  -0.234  0.424  -0.36  1.596***  2.001 *  *  *
(1.134)  (1.167)  (0.652)  (0.742)  (0.453)  (0.584)
Number of Observations  65  64  154  145  129  127
R-squared  0.7789  0.6911  0.5452  0.5339  0.5225  0.4444
significant at 1% level  significant at 5% level  * significant at 10% level
' Standard  errors,  corrected  for heteroscedasticity,  are in parentheses.  Coefficients  on the other  regressors  are not shown.  Other  regressors  are the same  as those listed in Table2.
bFor  all IV regressions  in Table  4, the instruments  for the following  variables  are the previous  five  year lag of itself and regional  and decade  dummy  variables:  per capita GDP;
relative  price of government  consumption;  openness;  and political  freedom.  All other  variables  were treated as exogenous.
£ The  R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with instrumental  variable  regressions.consumption  was  associated  with  lower  growth  through  the  independent  effect  of
goverrnent  size on growth. We return to this later in Section 5 of the paper.
When we apply the volatility measure, we find that for the high income countries,
the sign on the interaction term is actually negative and insignificant while for the middle
income group it is positive -- as we would predict -- but insignificant. In the case of the
low income countries while we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is not only
positive but large and very significant, this is also true for the volatility term itself.
These findings suggest several conclusions. First, there is evidence of asymmetry
in the response of government consumption to shocks. An adverse shift in the terms of
trade  is associated  with  more public  consumption.  Summarising external  risk  by  the
interaction of openness and the change in the terms of trade, a decline in the terms of
trade  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  government  size.  Second,  using  a  volatility
parameter instead likewise indicates that higher external risk  is indeed associated with
larger government consumption. Third, running the same regressions but distinguishing
by  income  level,  we  find  evidence  of  different  behaviour  across  categories.  Robust
evidence  of  government  stabilising  through consumption  only  holds  for  low  income
countries, whether using the volatility or change in terms of trade measure.  Fourth, while
it is possible that government in high income countries may stabilise primarily through
transfers, the link from external risk to consumption is less tight or general than Rodrik
(1996), for one, has argued.  Fifth, although our findings can partially be interpreted as
consistent with government acting as a buffer against risk, they could also simply indicate
the difficulties that countries have in reducing government size in the face of adversity.
26What may look like a policy of risk mitigation  may be little more than a more passive
inability  to roll-back  earlier commitments.
5. Government  and Growth
What are the consequences  of government for growth ?  Given the enormous
disparity  in growth rates in the period 1964-1993,  it is clearly  important  to know to what
extent such disparities can  be  attributed to  difference in  the  size and  actions of
government.
Table  5 provides  some  descriptive  numbers  that indicate  just how diverse  regions'
growth experiences  have been. The most striking contrast is obviously  from the poles of
the growth story; Sub-Saharan  Africa and East Asia. In 1960  average  per capita  income in
Sub-Saharan  Africa was equivalent  to that in East Asia and government  size was quite
similar. By the 1990s East Asian incomes were on average double  those in Africa but
government consumption  in the latter was over fifty percent larger when measured in
international  prices. We now look more systematically  at the apparent implications of
government  size and other interventions  on per capita growth  in GDP.
The basic structure  of the growth regressions  reported in Table 6 will be readily
recognisable.  Aside from a set of standard state variables  that have been found in earlier
studies to be robust  23__ initial income,  educational  attainment  as measured  by the mean
23 See, inter alia, Levine and Renelt (1992); Easterly and Rebelo (1993); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
27Table 5  Average Per Capita GDP Growth by Regiona
Per Capita GDP Growth in % b  Observations
S1985  nt'l  prices  1987  US  dollars
All Countries
1964-73  3.1  3.0  112
1974-83  0.9  1.0  126
1984-93  0.5  0.7  137
High Income OECD
1964-73  4.0  3.9  22
1974-83  1.4  1.6  22
1984-93  2.1  1.8  22
All Developing Countries
1964-73  2.8  2.7  87
1974-83  0.9  0.8  97
1984-93  0.2  0.4  108
Sub-Saharan Africa
1964-73  2.0  1.7  35
1974-83  0.1  0.0  38
1984-93  -0.6  -0.3  43
Latin America and Carribean
1964-73  2.8  2.8  25
1974-83  0.1  0.2  27
1984-93  0.7  1.2  29
East Asia and Pacific
1964-73  4.7  4.9  11
1974-83  3.3  3.8  12
1984-93  2.9  3.0  15
South Asia
1964-73  -0.4  0.5  5
1974-83  2.8  2.2  5
1984-93  2.4  2.5  5
Middle East and North Africa
1964-73  5.2  4.5  9
1974-83  -0.8  -0.0  13
1984-93  -2.5  -2.4  14
Europe and Central Asia
1964-73  5.4  5.5  5
1974-83  2.8  2.7  8
1984-93  0.6%  0.3%  8
'Source: PWT5.6  and World  Bank
b Per capita  GDP growth  in 1985  international  prices  only  available  up to 1992;  unless  otherwise  noted,  all regional
breakdowns  exclude  high  income  countries;  East  Asia and Pacific  includes  high income  countries  that are not
OECD  members;  Middle  East and North  Africa  includes  one high income  country.
28years of schooling,  and the population  growth  rate -- we also include the share of investment  in
GDP; these are the four Levine-Renelt  variables. While investment share of  GDP does not
precisely measure  the direct  effect of government  spending  on investment  -- the numbers  are not
available  broken down by public and private components  -- it does allow us to capture the effect
of aggregate  investment  on growth. We add a set of control variables. For government  size, we
use the share of government consumption in GDP.  in the OLS estimation and for the IV
estimation we plug  in the predicted values from the government size regression.  But, as
indicated  above, size alone -- whether given in terms of investment or consumption  outlays --
cannot adequately summarise  the dimensions  of government  action. Accordingly,  we introduce
two other variables that capture the indirect  effects  of government;  a policy distortion  index and
a measure  for the quality of bureaucracy.  We also look at the combined  effect  of government  size
and bureaucracy  through an interaction  term.  A terms of trade variable is included as well as
decade and regional dummies  . As before,  the regressions  are run on the pooled data set and
both OLS and IV results are initially  reported in Table 6.  In general,  the OLS and IV estimates
are very close; the discussion  concentrates  on the latter. In the IV regressions,  we instrument  for
investment  share  of GDP, government  size,  the interaction  of
24 We  also tested  for  the  effect  of political  and  civil freedoms  -- as measured  by  the Gastil  indices  -- on growth,
entering  the  term  both  linearly  and  in quadratic  form,  but  found  no significant  association.
29Table  6  GDP Growth  Regressions:  OLS and  Instrumental  Variable"
(Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth in 1985 International Prices)
Independent  Variables  OLS  OLS  IVb  IV
Constant  0.171***  0.161***  0.167***  0.136***
(0.022)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.038)
Dummy  for 1974-83  -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.014***
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)
Dummy  for 1984-93  -0.017***  -0.016*** -0.017***  -0.016***
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)
Initial Per Capita GDP  30.019***  -0.019***  -0.021***  -0.021***
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
Initial Schooling  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
Population Growth  -0.184  -0.209  -0.260  -0.304
(0.192)  (0.192)  (0.204)  (0.203)
Investment/GDP  0.009***  0.009***  0.008**  0.007**
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
Government Size  -0.016***  -0.022***  -0.023***  -0.038***
(0.004)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.015)
Quality of Bureaucracy  0.017*  0.041  0.027***  0.085*
(O  worst, I best)  (0.009)  (0.027)  (0.010)  (0.044)
Government Size*Quality of Bureaucracy  0.014  0.033
(0.014)  (0.024)
Policy Distortion  -0.006***  -0.006***  -0.005***  -0.005***
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)
Terms of Trade Changes  0.034  0.034  0.042  0.044
(0.040)  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.042)
Latin America Dummy  -0.017***  -0.017***  -0.015***  -0.015***
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  -0.030***  .0.030***  -0.028***  -0.028***
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)
Socialist Dummy  -0.008  -0.008  -0.013**  -0.013**
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)
Number of Observations  271  271  258  258
R-squared'  0.5196  0.5213  0.487  0.4921
***  significant  at 1%  level  **  significant  at 5% level  * significant  at 10%  level
' Standard  errors,  corrected  for heterscedasticity,  are in parentheses.
b For the IV regressions  in Table  6, the instruments  for the following  variables  are the previous  five  year lag of itself  and
regional  and decade  dummy  variables:  policy  distortion  and investment/GDP.  The  instrument  for the govemment  size
variable  is the prediction  from the government  size instrumental  variable  regression  reported  in Table  2. All other
variables  in the regression  were  treated  as exogenous.
'The  R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with  instrumental  variable  regressions.
30government size and the quality of bureaucracy and the policy distortion variable. The
instruments  are the average of the previous five year lags of each endogenous variable
except  for  govermnent  size  for  which  we  use  the  predicted  values  from  the  IV
government size regression (Table 2, column 4).
The state  variables  all have the predicted  signs. The  coefficient  on the  initial
25 income  term  indicates a  conditional  convergence rate  of  2.1  percent  per  annum
Human capital formation, as given by schooling, affects growth positively,  as does the
investment rate; the latter very significantly. Population growth exerts a negative effect
on  growth  while  the  terms  of  trade  variable  a  positive  effect.  Both  however  are
insignificant.  In  terms  of the  government variables,  we  pick  up  an  unambiguously
negative and significant effect from governmnent  consumption spending.  A one standard-
deviation increase in government consumption is associated with a decline in per capita
26 growth  rate  of  0.65 percentage  points  per  annum  . We also  find  an  unambiguous
negative growth effect of policy distortions that is significant at the I percent level. This
indicates  that  policy  distortions,  as  measured  by  our  index, will  have  a  predictably
negative effect on growth. However, the size of that effect, controlling for other variables,
as given by the coefficient on the policy term is not that large, at least relative to  the
government size variable (0.5 percentage points per annum).  By contrast, the quality of
bureaucracy  variable  exerts  a  sizeable,  positive  and  significant  effect  on  growth.
Similarly, interacting the government consumption term with the quality of bureaucracy
25 This  is close  to the  estimate  of 2.6 percent  reported  by  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1995).
26  Again,  close  to the 0.7 estimate  of Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995).
31variable  --  an  attempt  to  coax  out  the  combined  implications  --  yields  a  positive
coefficient.
In  a  simple  standard  endogenous  growth  model  such  as  Barro  (1991)  the
relationship between growth and government size is non-linear.  Per capita growth can
even become negative if government share of output approaches zero or unity. Under
some  parametric  restrictions,  Barro  derives  an  inverted-U  type  relationship  between
government share of output and growth. This raises the question whether the log-linear
regression  that  we  have  reported  is  a  misspecification.  We  experiment  by  adding  a
quadratic term in government size to all growth regressions (as given in Table 6).  The
coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms are not significantly  different from  zero
either jointly  or individually.  To  investigate if  this  result  is  driven by  the  fact that
government size is in  logs, we take  its anti-log  and  enter government  size as  a ratio
ranging from  zero to  one.  Under this  specification,  government  size  by  itself is  still
negative and statistically significant. When we add the square of the ratio of government
size to the regressions, we find a U-curve relationship. However only the linear term is
negative and statistically significant (i.e. most of the observations lie on the downward
sloping portion of the U-curve).  In sum, we find that the linear-quadratic relationship as
a simple form  of non-linearity does not  conform with the predictions  of the standard
endogenous  growth  model.  However,  within  a  linear  specification,  we  still  find  a
statistically significant negative relationship whether government is entered as a ratio or
in logs, a finding that is consistent with the Barro-type model.
32What have been the implications for the relative performance of countries and
regions ?  To look at this more closely, we now decompose  these factors by region.
Figure I , based on the IV regression  (Table 6, column 4) separates out the effects of
government  size, policy, investment,  education  and the quality of government  on growth.
The results are presented  in terms of the factors  accounting  for the difference  of particular
regions' growth from the world average. We combine  policy and investment,  as we can
think of the latter being strongly correlated with the quality of policy; a feature that
27 clearly emerges  from empirical  work  on the determinants  of investment
We can see that large government  size has indeed  been a factor accounting  for the
relatively  poor perfonnance of countries  in Africa,  the Middle East and North Africa, as
well as in South Asia.  But it is also clear that policy, investment and the quality of
bureaucracy are important in explaining the differences across countries.  Thus, Sub-
Saharan  Africa's poor perfornance over the period 1964-1993  can be attributed  not only
to low educational  attainment,  high population  growth and large relative government  size
but also to the presence  of poor policy and low investment. In addition,  countries  in that
region have not benefited  from a high quality of bureaucracy  so that there is a strong
combined  negative  effect  from government  size and the quality of bureaucracy.
In short, when evaluating  the consequences  of government  for growth, it is not
simply size that is relevant. Bad policies -- as indicated through over-valued  exchange
rates and pervasive  trade restrictions  -- hold down a country's growth  while the quality  of
27  There  is a large  literature.  Among  others,  Keefer  and  Knack  (1995).
33government can exert a positive effect on performance.  And it is clear that countries and
regions that have fared least well tend to do worst on all three indicators.  It is the
combination of government size and the quality of policy and institutions that seems to
matter.
Figures 2 and 3 show another illustration of  the growth decomposition. They are
based  on  the IV regression of the  Table 6, column  4  and use  a  methodology  that  is
routinely used in the interpretation of regression results. The methodology is as follows.
Each cell in the figures is constructed as one standard deviation band around the mean of
28 the respective variable. This generates the four cells in each figure  . For each cell, we
calculated the fitted regression at the average values of all the remaining right hand side
variables. The fitted value is the implied growth rate for the cell and is plotted  in each
figure. Figure 2 shows that, other things being equal, countries that are characterised by
low quality of bureaucracy and high policy distortion will, on average, grow at a rate of
0.42 percent per year, whereas countries in the extreme polar case of high quality and low
distortion  (the best case scenario) will grow at a much higher rate of 3.04 percent per
year.
These are staggering numbers. We have calculated the number of years it will take
for  an  average  country to  double  its  per capita  GDP  under  each of  the  scenarios in
Figures  2 and  3.  Results are shown in Panels A  and B under each figure.  Panel A
shows that, other things being equal, a country that follows distortionary policies and has
28 We also  experimented  with  two  standard  deviations.  The ranking  of growth  rates  in the cells in each
graph does not change.
34a low quality  of bureaucracy  will, on average,  take 165  years to double its per capita  GDP
as opposed to 23 years in the best case scenario of low distortion and high quality.
Similarly, Panel B shows that, other things being equal, a  country that has a  high
government  size ratio and a low quality of bureaucracy  will on average  take 239 years to
double its per capita GDP as opposed  to 22 years  in the best case scenario  of high quality
and low size. Are these number unrealistic? No; as the following  examples illustrate.
Starting  in 1870,  it took the United  States 31 years and Brazil 57 years to double  their per
capita GDP. Since 1960,  East Asian countries  more than doubled  their per capita GDP in
30 years. Sub-Saharan  Africa countries  on the other hand,  while starting  with comparable
levels of per capita GDP and government  size in 1960  as the East Asian countries,  have
only increased  per capita GDP by about 50 percent  in 30 years.
6.  Government  and Well-being
Growth in  income is  obviously critical;  hence  our  concentration on  the
consequences  of government  for income. But it is only one of several measures  that we
can use to look at the consequences  of government. For example, concern with raising
peoples' ability to function implies that  performance  should also be judged on other
standards  of well-being,  such as infant mortality,  schooling  and life expectancy  29.  These
outcomes  will reflect not only the impact of income growth  but also the direct effects of
social spending  by government.  The latter will in turn be affected  by the average  income
29 Sen (1987).
35level.  For example, Anand and Ravallion (1993) attribute roughly two-thirds of the
elasticity of life expectancy with regard to average income to  the positive effect of
income on public health spending and roughly one-third to the decrease in  income-
measured  poverty  associated  with higher mean incomes.
We look at the direct relationship between the infant mortality rate and life
expectancy  and per capita GDP growth and the share of social sector spending in GDP.
We control for initial income, a measure of income inequality  -- as given by a country's
Gini coefficient  for income,  a measure of political  freedom -- as measured  by the Gastil
index, the quality of bureaucracy,  and regional  and decade dummies.  We instrument  for
per capita GDP growth, social spending share of GDP, political freedom and income
inequality. The instruments are the average of  the previous five year lags of each
endogenous variable except for per capita GDP growth rate for which we use the
predicted  values from the IV growth  regression  (Table 6, column 4). Table 7 reports the
OLS and IV results from two regressions  explaining  infant mortality  and life expectancy.
As usual, we concentrate  on the IV estimates.  Essentially, we get qualitatively  similar
results from the two regressions 30.  Life expectancy  and infant mortality --  the latter
significantly --  improve as  a result of income growth. Further, the  share of  social
spending by govermnent is associated with higher life expectancy and lower infant
30 This is not unexpected  as some life expectancy  data  are  extrapolated  from infant  mortality  rates  and
therefore  may not contain  any additional  information  (See Pritchett  and Summers  (1996)).  We thank
Lant Pritchett  for this observation.
36Table 7  Government and Well-Being Regressions: OLS and Instrumental Variable"
(Dependent Variables:  Infant Mortality Rate and Life Expectancy)
Infant  Mortality  Life Expectancy
Independent  Variables  OLS  IV  b  OLS  IV
Constant  7.851***  11.872***  0.161***  -6.223***
(0.024)  (0.383)  (0.024)  (0.383)
Dummy for 1974-83  -0.118  -0.794***  -0.015***  0.336**
(0.147)  (0.199)  (0.003)  (0.130)
Dummy for 1984-93  -0.428**  -1.119***  -0.016***  0.538***
(0.166)  (0.230)  (0.004)  (0.151)
Initial Per Capita GDP  -0.780***  -1.128***  0.450***  0.542***
(0.097)  (0.137)  (0.060)  (0.089)
Per Capita GDP Growth  -5.684*  -31.446***  2.792  8.844*
(3.061)  (7.367)  (1.940)  (5.183)
Social Spending/GDP  -0.341***  -0.289***  0.155***  0.136***
(0.074)  (0.074)  (0.048)  (0.052)
Quality of Bureaucracy  -0.865**  0.142  0.076  -0.237
(O  worst, I best)  (0.392)  (0.446)  (0.236)  (0.282)
Political Freedom  0.023  0.034  -0.043*  -0.045*
(I high, 7 low)  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.022)  (0.025)
Income Inequality  'O.036***  0.003***  -0.012**  -0.012**
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.006)
Latin America Dummy  -0.051  -0.475*  0.002  0.164
(0.192)  (0.210)  (0.111)  (0.122)
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  -0.405*  -1.341***  -0.195  0.057
(0.243)  (0.370)  (0.142)  (0.229)
East Asia Dummy  -0.434**  -0.239  0.007  0.005
(0.188)  (0.184)  (0.094)  (0.097)
Socialist Dummy  -0.106  -0.317*  -0.033  -0.027
______  _  (0.223)  (0.184)  (0.141)  (0.150)
Number of Observations  105  91  105  91
R-squared'  0.8723  0.8811  0.8494  0.8404
*** significant  at 1%  level  significant  at 5% level  *  significant  at 1%  level
'Standard errors,  corrected  for heteroscedasticity,  are in parentheses.
b For all IV regressions  in Table  7, the instruments  for the following  variables  are the previous  five year lag of itself
and regional  decade  dummy  variables:  social  spending/GDP;  political  freedom;  and income  inequality.  The
instrument  for GDP  growth is the prediction  from the growth instrumental  variable  regression  reported  in Table
6. All other  variables  in the regression  were treated  as exogenous.
The R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with instrumental  variable  regressions.
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mortality  . The point estimates  on social spending  are significantly  different  from zero
at 1 percent level. In addition, the quality of bureaucracy  also affects these well-being
indicators.  However,  the effect is not significantly  different  from zero once we condition
on initial income. In fact we find that initial income is a powerful indicator of  how
countries  are doing  with respect  to infant mortality  and life expectancy  32. The elasticities
of  infant mortality and life expectancy  with respect to initial per capita GDP are -1.128
and 0.542, respectively,  both of which are significant at the 1 percent level 33.  Lack of
political freedoms  exerts a negative effect on both infant mortality  and life expectancy
but this is only significant  at the 10 percent level in the case of life expectancy. It is
interesting  to observe  that higher inequality  of income in a country has unambiguously
adverse consequences  for these indicators.  The point estimates  are significantly  different
from zero at the I percent level.  This suggests  that one channel  through  which inequality
will generate long run consequences  is through poorer health outcomes. Poor health
outcomes  can in turn have long-run  growth effects if life expectancy  and infant morta!ity
34 are in turn allowed  to enter the growth  regression.
Alberto  Alesina  suggested  controlling  for total government  expenditure.  We reran  the well-being
regressions  including  total  govermment  expenditure  net of social  spending  as a fraction  of GDP in
addition  to the other variables  given in Table  7. We found  that this variable  was  not statistically
significant  and that  the addition  of this variable  did not change  our previous  results.
32 Like the growth  regression,  we do not instrument  for the initial  income  since it is predetermined  with
respect  to future  movements  in life expectancy  and infant  mortality.
These point  estimates  are much higher  than those reported  by Pritchett  and Summers  (1996).  The
differences  are due to the use of different  conditioning  variables,  different  transformations  on the
dependent  variables  and different  time averaging  of data. Our estimates  can be considered  as longer-
run elasticities  than those of Pritchett  and Summers(1996).
34 In fact as a sensitivity  test we included  these indicators  separately  in the growth  regression.  We found
that better  well-being  indicators  are indeed  associated  with  higher growth  and that other  variables  in
the growth  regression  continued  to be significant  and  with the same  sign as before.
387.  How Robust are these Findings ?
To this point, we have reported results from OLS and IV regressions. In both the
size and growth regressions, the estimates were found to be stable. In the life expectancy
and infant mortality regressions, the OLS and IV produced qualitatively similar results;
and the variables that were statistically significant under OLS  continued to be significant
under IV as well.  We now undertake two further exercises. The first involves the joint
estimation of size, growth, infant mortality and life expectancy regressions. The second
looks at how sensitive our results are to measurement error and the specification of the
regression model.
7.1.  System Estimation
The system of four equations represents a simultaneous equation system. Growth
depends, among other things, on government size; government size is in turn determined
by another equation; and in the remaining two equations, growth affects life expectancy
and infant mortality. In addition to the four left-hand side variables, there are many other
endogenous  variables  in  the  system.  In  terms  of  the  empirical  work,  the  resulting
endogeneity needs to be addressed, otherwise it will lead to biased parameter estimates.
So far, we have taken care of the endogeneity problem by applying the IV technique on
each equation separately. Although preferable to OLS, the IV technique suffers from two
shortcomings.  First,  even  in  the  absence  of  simultaneity,  it is  more  efficient  to  use
system-wide estimation techniques  than single-equation techniques  since errors can be
correlated across equations. Sources of cross-equation correlation can be the impact of
39unobserved  common  shocks, unobserved  country-specific  effects or  common  omitted
variables  or  all of the above.  In the  data we do  find that  errors across  equations  are
correlated.  Second. system-wide estimation  methods  are preferable  to  single equation
methods  since they use information in other parts of the system that  will increase the
efficiency  of  parameter  estimates.  However,  with  these  advantages  also  comes  one
important disadvantage relative to the single equation IV technique: misspecification  in
one equation,  when estimated as part of a system,  can lead to biased and  inconsistent
parameter  estimates in  that equation  and  the  rest  of the  system5 . Because  of  these
problems with both techniques and in the absence of a fully-specified structural model, it
is  good  practice  to  report  all  three  estimation  techniques.  This  provides  additional
sensitivity tests needed for cross-country analysis. We use three stage least square (3SLS)
as a system-wide estimation technique which takes care of simultaneity as well as cross-
equation correlation 36 .
The  four  equation  system  has  14  endogenous  variables  and  16  exogenous
variables  . Much  like  the  single  equation  IV,  we need  to  confront  the  choice  of
instruments for all the endogenous variables. We adopt two approaches. In the first, we
use  the  samne  instrument  set  as  in  the  single  equation  IV.  These  are  predetermined
35 A typical  mis-specification  bias  is an invalid  exclusion  restriction  or an invalid  instrument.
36 For  other  applications  of 3SLS  in the  endogenous  growth  literature,  see  Tavares  and  Wacziarg  (1996),
Barro  (1996b),  and  Alesina  and  Perotti  (1996).
37 The  system  is identified  via  exclusion  restrictions,  parameter  constancy  across  time  periods  and satisfies
the  rank  and  order  conditions  of the  SEMs  (see  Green  (1993),  p.594).
40variables  (i.e., lagged endogenous variables in  the model)  38.  However, unlike in  the
single equation IV regression where each lagged endogenous variable is used only as the
instrument for that endogenous variable, in the system regressions, the entire instrument
set for each system is used for all the endogenous variables. In the second approach, we
use as instruments only variables within the model that we consider exogenous as well as
exogenous  variables  that are not present in the model  39;  this  instrument  set does  not
include  lagged  endogenous  variables.  Again,  these  instruments  are  used  for  all  the
endogenous variables within the system.
In a simultaneous equation system.  it is quite likely  that instruments that are a
better match with endogenous variables in one equation -- based on the criteria of a high
adjusted R-squared from the first-stage regression and theoretically-correct signs from the
second and third stage regressions -- may not be good instruments in other equations 40.
Indeed, in the context of our four equation system, the choice of the two instrument sets
makes  a great  deal of  difference. Specifically, we  find  that when  lagged  endogenous
variables  are  used  as  instruments,  the  first-stage  adjusted  R-squared  is  consistently
higher than when exogenous variables are used as instruments even though they are fewer
lagged endogenous variables used as instruments. We also find that lagged endogenous
variables  are a better  match with the  growth and size regressions  (based on the same
38 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1995),  Barro  (I 996a, I  996b)  for this approach.  Note that lagged
endogenous  variables  are predetermined  variables  since  error terrns  are not correlated  across  decades.
39  See Tavares  and Wacziarg  (1996)  and Dollar  and Burnside  (1996) for this approach.
40 We do not base our  judgment  on the R-squared  from the 2SLS  or 3SLS  as these  R-squared  cannot be
used as model  selection  criteria.
41criteria  as  above)  than  with  the  life  expectancy  and  infant  mortality  regressions.
Consequently,  we  present  3SLS  estimates  of  three  systems:  growth  and  size;  life
expectancy and infant mortality; and finally all four regressions.
Table 8  contains  3SLS estimates of growth and  size  regressions  using  lagged
endogenous variables as instruments. All the variables in the growth regressions have the
same signs as the OLS and IV regressions and with even higher statistical significance. In
comparison, we seem to have achieved extra efficiency by a  system estimation.  Point
estimates are also close to the OLS and IV estimates; only changes in the terms-of-trade
has a higher coefficient which is now statistically significant at the 10 percent level; the
convergence rate is about 2 percent per annum. With regard to the size regression, the
signs of all the variables are the same as the OLS and IV  regressions; Wagner's law still
does not hold; and unlike the single equation OLS and IV regressions, the terms-of-trade
changes and its interaction with openness are no longer significant.
Table  9  contains  the 3SLS estimates of  infant mortality  and  life expectancy
regressions using exogenous variables as instruments 4'.  In comparison to the OLS and
IV  regressions,  per  capita  GDP  growth  has  the  wrong  sign  in  the  life  expectancy
regressions,  but  the  right  sign  in  the  infant  mortality  regression.  However,  neither
coefficient is significantly different from zero.  Much like the OLS and IV regressions,
growth does not matter much for these measures of well-being once we control for initial
per capita GDP. Initial per capita GDP, income inequality and social spending continue to
Using  lagged  endogenous  variables  does  produce  higher  adjusted  R-squared,  but  signs  of some
coefficients  do not conforrn  with the OLS and IV results.
42Table 8  System  Estimation  of Two Equations:Three  Stage  Least Square"
Independent Variable: Growth  Independent Variable: Government Size
Dependent variables  Dependent variables
Constant  0.159***  Constant  -1.333***
(0.026)  (0.422)
Dummy for 1974-83  -0.015***  Dummy for 1974-83  0.036
(0.003)  (0.041)
Dummy for 1984-93  -0.017***  Dummy for 1984-93  0.089**
(0.004)  (0.043)
Initial Per Capita GDP  -0.019***  Per capita GDP  0.066
(0.003)  (0.050)
Initial Schooling  0.003***  Age Dependency Ratio  0.318***
(0.002)  (0.111)
Population Growth  -0.335*"*  Urbanization Ratio  -0.002
(0.165)  (0.050)
Investment/GDP  0.006*'*  Relative Price of Government  -0.697***
Consumption
(0.003)  (0.064)
Government Size  -0.021***  Openness  0.136***
(0.008)  (0.041)
Quality of Bureaucracy  0.056**  Terms of Trade Changes  -0.851
(0 worst, I best)  (0.029)  (0.906)
Government Size * Quality of  0.022  Openness * Terms of Trade Changes  -1.422
Bureaucracy
(0.016)  (1.015)
Policy Distortion  -0.006***  Years Since Independence  -0.164***
(0.002)  (0.058)
Terms of Trade Changes  0.064*  Political Freedom  -0.012
(0.036)  (I high, 7 low)  (0.014)
Latin America Dummy  -0.016***  Federal Dummy  -0.073
(0.003)  (0.053)
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  -0.030***  Latin America Dummy  -0.199***
(0.005)  (0.043)
Socialist Dummy  -0.015***  East Asia Dummy  -0.339***
(0.005)  (0.067)
Number of  Observations  257  257
System R-squaredb  0.5581
*** significant at 1% level  **  significant at 5% level  * significant at 10% level
*Correlation  among  the error terms  of the two equations  is 0.02. The  numbers  in parentheses  denote  standard  errors.
The instruments  are initial per  capita GDP,  initial per  capita  GDP squared  and previous  five year lagged  averages
of the following  endogenous  variables:  investment/GDP;  govemment  size; govemment  size * bureaucracy;
policy  distortion;  per capita  GDP;  relative  price  of government  consumption;  openness;  openness  * terms of
trade changes;  and political  freedom.
b System R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with  instrumental  variable  regressions.
43Table 9  System  Estimation  of Two Equations:  Three  Stage  Least Squares
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables  Infant Mortality  Life Expectancy
Constant  4.321**  -2.660**
(1.966)  (1.278)
Dummy for 1974-83  -0.116  0.089
(0.179)  (0.116)
Dummy for 1984-93  -0.349**  0.311  ***
(0.186)  (0.121)
Initial Per Capita GDP  -0.584***  0.303***
(0.157)  (0.102)
Per Capita GDP Growth  -7.534  -1.378
(6.113)  (3.974)
Social Spending/GDP  -0.516** *  0.233** *
(0.124)  (0.081)
Quality of Bureaucracy  -1.074**  0.077
(0 worst, I best)  (0.557)  (0.362)
Political Freedom  0.129  -0.121*
(I high, 7 low)  (0.101)  (0.066)
Income Inequality  0.070***  -0.034***
(0.017)  (0.011)
Latin America Dummy  -0.752**  0.354*
(0.320)  (0.208)
East Asia Dummy  -0.560**  0.267
(0.311)  (0.202)
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  -0.892***  0.004
(0.351)  (0.228)
Socialist Dummy  -0.220  -0.159
(0.527)  (0.343)
Number of Observations  91  91
System R-Squaredb  0.8230
*'  significant  at 1%  level  ** significant  at 5% level  significant  at 10%  level
Correlation  between  the error terms  of the two equations  is  -0.79***. Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  The
instruments  are: initital  per capita  GDP;  initial per capita  GDP squared;  population  growth;  initial schooling;
quality  of bureaucracy;  terms  of trade  changes;  number  of assassinations;  number  of coups,  age dependency
ratio; urbanization  ratio;  population  density;  years since  independence;  federal  dummy;  socialist  dummy;  Latin
America  dummy;  East  Asia dummy;  Sub-Saharan  Africa  dummy  and decade  dummy  variables.
b System  R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with  instrumental  variable  regressions.
44be statistically  significant  at the 1 per cent level. Across the three estimation  methods,  we
continue to find that countries that have high life expectancy  and low infant mortality
tend to have high social spending, more equitable distribution of income, higher per
capita  income,  a higher level of political  freedom  and better bureaucracy.
Table 10  reports 3SLS estimates of  the  four equation system with  lagged
endogenous  variables as the instruments.  Except for per capita GDP growth in the life
expectancy  and infant mortality regressions,  all variables in the system have the same
signs as the previous two tables, but with fewer statistically  significant  coefficients.  One
reason has to  with the  reduction in  sample size which has  reduced cross-country
variations in the dependent  and independent  variables. Another reason is that gains in
efficiency  via estimating a four-equation  estimation may have been swamped  by using
the same instruments  for all the endogenous  variables, a factor which  was alluded earlier.
Estimating  the same system with the exogenous  variables as instruments  produces more
variables  with signs that are different  from the two equation  system, the OLS or the IV
*  42 regressions
7.2. Sensitivity  Analysis
How sensitive  are our results to measurement  errors and the specification  of the
estimated  equations?  We focus on three areas. First, we test for sensitivity  to individual
observations  to see if our estimates are affected by outliers in the data with particular
attention  to the relationship  between  government  size and growth. Second,  we re-
42 These results  are available  from  authors upon  request.
45Table  10  System Estimation  of Four Equations:  Three  Stage Least Square' 
Dependent Variable: Growth  Dependent Variable: Government Size
Independent Variables  Independent Variables
Constant  0.146***  Constant  -1.780***
(0.038)  (0.851)
Dummy for 1974-83  -0.009*  Dummy for 1974-83  0.031
(0.005)  (0.083)
Dummy for 1984-93  -0.009*  Dummy for 1984-93  0.074
(0.005)  (0.089)
Initial Per Capita GDP  -0.022***  Per capita GDP  0.135
(0.004)  (0.113)
Initial Schooling  0.005  Age Dependency Ratio  0.267
(0.006)  (0.240)
Population Growth  -0.333  Urbanization Ratio  -0.095
(0.269)  (0.099)
Investment/GDP  0.001  Relative Price of Government  -0.887***
Consumption
(0.006)  (0.191)
Government Size  -0.037***  Openness  0.091
(0.012)  (0.094)
Quality of Bureaucracy  0.059  Terms of Trade Changes  -1.021
(0 worst, I best)  (0.044)  (1.976)
Government Size * Quality of  0.031  Openness * Terms of Trade Changes  -1.020
Bureaucracy
(0.024)  (1.976)
Policy Distortion  -0.006***  Years Since Independence  -0.139
(0.002)  (0.135)
Terms of Trade Changes  0.180***  Political Freedom  -0.029
(0.054)  (I high, 7 low)  (0.022)
Latin America Dummy  -0.018***  Federal Dummy  -0.110
(0.005)  (0.108)
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  -0.026***  Latin America Dummy  -0.229***
(0.009)  (0.084)
Socialist Dummy  -0.026***  East Asia Dummy  -0.304***
(0.009)  (0.126)
Number of Observations  91  91
System R-squaredb  0.7420
' Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  The instruments  are: initial  per capita  GDP;  initial  per capita  GDP squared;
federal  dummy;  initial income  inequality;  initial  social  spending/GDP;  socialist  dummy;  Latin America  dummy;
Sub-Saharan  Africa  dummy;  constant;  decade  dummy  variables;  previous  five  year lagged  variables  of policy
distortion,  investment/GDP;  relative  price of government  consumption,  openness;  political  freedom,  government
size, and growth;  lagged  government  size*  quality  of bureaucracy;  and lagged  openness*terms  of trade  changes.
b System  R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with instrumental  variable  regressions.
46Table 10  continued System  Estimation  of Four Equations: Three  Stage  Least  Square
Dependent Variable
Independent  Variables  Infant  Mortality  Life Expectancy
Constant  7.389***  -4.540***
(1.208)  (0.726)
Dummy  for 1974-83  -0.109  0.106
(0.173)  (0.105)
Dummy  for 1984-93  -0.363**  0.306***
(0.182)  (0.110)
Initial Per Capita  GDP  -0.765***  0.407***
(0.117)  (0.071)
Per Capita  GDP  Growth  1.308  -1.891
(6.589)  (3.952)
Social Spending/GDP  -0.376* **  0.174*  * *
(0.097)  (0.058)
Quality  of Bureaucracy  -0.855**  0.051
(O  worst, I best)  (0.436)  (0.264)
Political  Freedom  0.029  -0.051**
(I high, 7 low)  (0.043)  (0.025)
Income Inequality  0.037***  -0.015***
(0.010)  (0.006)
Latin America  Dummy  -0.049  0.022
(0.232)  (0.139)
East Asia Dummy  -0.699***  0.135
(0.279)  (0.166)
Sub-Saharan  Africa Dummy  -0.335  -0.262
(0.350)  (0.211)
Socialist  Dummy  0.201  -0.234
(0.325)  (0.196)
Number of Observations  91  91
System  R-Squared  0.7420
t** significant  at 1%  level  ** significant  at 5%  level  * significant  at 10%  level
Correlation  Among  Error  Terms
Life Expectancy  Infant  Mortality  Growth  Size
Life Expectancy  1
Infant Mortality  -0.78  1
Growth  0.30  -0.17  1
Size  -0.01  -0.01  0.05  1
47estimate the growth and size.  regressions using the World Bank data in constant dollars.
In  particular,  we  focus on  the measure  of government  size and  the  relative  price  of
govemrnment  consumption.  Finally, we address the inclusion of regional dummy variables
in the regression.
Individual data points with large residuals or high leverage - outliers - may or may
43 not  exert disproportionate  influence on our estimates  . To  test for outliers,  we  re-
estimated our three sets of regressions  - OLS and IV government size, growth and well-
being regressions - after removing data points identified as having a large residual and/or
high  leverage  in  each  regression.  Anywhere  from  five  to  eleven  data  points  were
identified as outliers in each regression.  The results after removing the outliers in all our
-regression sets were not significantly different from our estimations using the full sample.
We  delve  fuirther in  our  outlier  analysis  to  check  for  the  robustness  of  the
government size and growth relationship.  In the growth regressions, there was a negative
and significant relationship between government size and growth.  To test whether this
result is due to  a few observations with either  1) a large government size and low  or
negative growth or 2) a small government size and high growth rates we re-estimated the
two sets of growth regressions after removing outliers in government size and per capita
GDP growth rates 4.  In all cases, the relationship remained negative and significant and
the other parameters in the regression were not significantly affected.
3 See Belsley,  Kuh and Welsch  (1980).
44 Four  new sets of regressions  were re-estimated.  First, observations  with large  government  size - one or
one and a half standard  deviations  greater  than  the sample  mean  of government  size - were removed.
Second, observations  with  small  government  size - one or one and a half standard  deviations  less than
the sample  mean of government  size - were removed. Third, observations  with  high per capita GDP
48The second type of sensitivity analysis compares estimation of govermnent size
and growth regressions using Summers-Heston data with that  using World Bank data.
Table I indicated the difference in the government consumption size measure that arose
when using World Bank data in  1987 constant US dollar prices rather than international
prices.  In particular, government  size in the low income countries of  South Asia  and
Sub-Saharan  Africa  would  be  significantly reduced  wvhen  using  1987 constant  dollar
prices, while govenmment  size in the high income countries would be increased relative to
purchasing power parity values  . To test the sensitivity of our results to the deflators, we
now re-estimate the growth and size regressions but this time use the World Bank data in
constant dollars. Tables 11 reports results of the size regression  from the OLS and IV
estimations for both constant dollar and international prices for the same set of countries.
While the explanatory power of the regression is very much lower using constant
dollar values in the size regression (0.3675 versus 0.5791), the signs on the explanatory
variables are generally the same. The main difference when using World Bank data is that
we  now  find  a  significantly  positive  association  bet.  -- en  the  income  level  and
government size; an apparent confirmation of Wagner's  LW  46 . One interpretation of
growth  - one or one and a half standard  deviations  greater  than the sample  mean of the per capita
GDP growth  rate -were removed.  Fourth,  observations  with low  or negative  per capita GDP growth  -
one or one and a half standard  deviations  less  than the sample  mean of the per capita GDP  growth rate
- were removed.
The greatest  sensitivity  -- as can be seen from  Table I -- is in South  Asia. To check  the robustness  of the
estimates,  we ran the same regressions  without  South  Asia. The sign and size of the coefficients  was
not substantially  affected.
46 A simple  correlation  of government  size and  per capita income  is also positive  and significant  at the I
percent level.
49Table  11  Government  Size Regressions:  Sensitivity of Estimation  to Choice  of  Deflators'
(Dependent Variable: Government Consumption/GDP)
1987 US Dollars  1985 International  Prices
Independent  Variables  OLS  IVb  OLS  IV
Constant  -2.539***  -2.410***  -1.431***  -1.193***
(0.289)  (0.295)  (0.384)  (0.424)
Dummy for 1974-83  0.032  0.043  0.024  0.063
(0.051)  (0.052)  (0.039)  (0.042)
Dummy for 1984-93  0.073  0.084  0.071  *  0.106**
(0.051)  (0.071)  (0.042)  (0.044)
PerCapitaGDP  0.151***  0.129***  0.082  0.048
(0.036)  (0.036)  (0.051)  (0.055)
Age Dependency Ratio  0.472***  0.318**  0.435***  0.373**
(0.152)  (0.153)  (0.155)  (0.157)
Urbanization Ratio  -0.022  0.002  -0.025  -0.011
(0.048)  (0.050)  (0.041)  (0.047)
Relative Price of Government  -0.216***  -0.225***  -0.700***  -0.720***
(0.068)  (0.080)  (0.069)  (0.092)
Openness  0.184***  0.142**  0.116***  0.076*
(0.053)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.044)
Terms of Trade Changes (TOT)  -2.784  -2.572***  -2.439***  -2.694***
(0.949)  (0.043)  (0.894)  (0.968)
Openness*TOT  -3.181  -2.986* **  -2.750* **  -3.062***
(1.181)  (1.101)  (0.940)  (0.942)
Years Since Independence  -0.004  -0.060  -0.1 16*  -0.155**
(0.070)  (0.071)  (0.060)  (0.069)
Political Freedom  -0.024*  -0.021  -0.031 **  -0.031  **
(I high, 7 low)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)
Federal Dummy  0.004  -0.021  -0.041  -0.053
(0.059)  (0.059)  (0.043)  (0.043)
Latin America Dummy  -0.285***  -0.265***  -0.207***  -0.168***
(0.062)  (0.065)  (0.050)  (0.057)
East Asia Dummy  -0.190**  -0.166*  -0.284**  -0.296***
!_________________________________  (0.081)  (0.086)  (0.042)  (0.053)
Number of Observations  297  290  297  290
R-squaredc  0.3675  0.3402  0.5791  0.5404
*  significant  at 1%  level  **  significant  at 5% level  * significant  at 10%  level
Standard  errors,  corrected  for heteroscedasticity,  are in parentheses.
bFor  all IV  regressions  in Table I1, the instruments  for  the following  variables  are the previous  five  year lag of itself
and regional  regional  and decade  dummy  variables:  per capita  GDP;  relative  price  of government  consumption;
openness;  and political  freedom.  All other  variables  in  the regressioin  were treated  as exogenous.
The  R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with instrumental  variable  regressions.
50this finding  is that, in measuring  government  size and per capita GDP, Summers-Heston
data has managed to correct for cost of living differences across countries.  With the
World Bank data, however,  the relative  ranking  of countries  based  on government  size or
per capita GDP has on average remained the same. Relative prices of  government
consumption  of goods and services continues  to be negatively  signed and  significant  at
the 1 percent level no matter whether the data is measured in constant 1987 US dollar
prices or constant 1985  intemational  prices.
The point estimates  of the relative  price variable  in the government  size regression
show perhaps an unusually  large responsiveness  of government  consumption  to its price
measured  relative to the price of private consumption  goods (-0.644 OLS and -0.724 IV
in  Table 2).  To the extent that relative prices of public and private goods differ
systematically  over time and across countries,  this discrepancy  is expected to affect the
real quantity  of goods and services  purchased  by the government.  However,  to the extent
that government  purchases  of goods and services  may not be comparable  across countries
(e.g., due to subsidies  and taxes; monopsony  power  of government)  the point estimates  in
Table 2 could show  too high a price elasticity. An alternative  estimate of price elasticity
can be derived using World Bank constant dollar prices which shows an elasticity of -
0.225 (IV Table 11). This discrepancy can be traced to  marked differences in  the
measurement of relative prices across the two data sets. In the Summers-Heston  data,
services are more expensive in high income countries  whereas in the World Bank data,
51services are more expensive in low income countries 47.  This is important because
services compose a large share of government consumption in low income countries.
Finally, to  sharpen further the  point estimate of  price  elasticity, we  revisited the
Summers-Heston  data and excluded  countries  that Summers  and Heston had given a low
quality rating (quality D) and re-estimated the size regression of  Table 2 using the
remaining  data. As expected,  this reduced  the estimate of elasticity  to -0.578  (OLS) and -
0.697 (IV).
Turning to  the growth estimations (Table 12), we can again largely replicate
results. The growth  regression  that uses World Bank data has a lower R-squared (0.5602
versus 0.6161) than the regression  with constant 1985  international  prices  . For the IV
regression,  we again plug in the prediction  from the size regression  of Table 11. Lagged
five-year averages  are used as instruments  for the other endogenous  variables. The state
variables generally yield similar signs and point estimates.  In the case of the initial
income  or convergence  term, the coefficient  when using the World  Bank values is smaller
in absolute value, indicating a slower conditional  convergence  rate of 0.3 percentage
points per year as opposed to 1.8 percentage  points  . The government  size variable is
negative  and significant  in both estimations.  The quality of bureaucracy  variable
47The  correlation  coefficient  between  relative  prices of government  consumption  and real per capita  GDP is
0.62 when using Summers  Heston  data and -0.1 when using World  Bank  data; both  are significant  at I
percent  level.
The dependent  variable  is different,  but it is known  that per capita  growth  from the two data sets are
closer to each other  than the level of per capita GDP  (see Table  5 and Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995)
p. 444). Hence,  the comparison  of the R-squared  is valid and is in fact  equivalent  to a non-nested  J-
type hypothesis  test carried  out by Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995).
49 See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1995).
52Table  12 GDP Growth  Regressions:  Sensitivity of Estimation  to Choice of Deflatorsa
(Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth)
1987 US Dollars  1985 International  Prices
Independent  Variables  OLS  IVb  OLS  IV
Constant  0.1I1***  -0.040  0.169***  0.126***
(0.020)  (0.035)  (0.022)  (0.025)
Dummy for 1974-83  -0.019***  -0.012***  -0.016***  -0.012***
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)
Dummy for 1984-93  -0.021 ***  -0.013***  -0.016***  -0.012***
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)
Initial Per Capita GDP  .0.009***  -0.003*  -0.020***  -0.018***
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)
Initial Schooling  0.003  0.001  0.005*  0.002
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
Population Growth  -0.411 *  -0.146  -0.240  -0.116
(0.227)  (0.181)  (0.200)  (0.196)
Investment/GDP  0.014***  0.011**  0.010***  0.008**
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)
Govemment  Size  -0.009**  -0.059***  -0.019***  -0.035***
(0.004)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.009)
Quality of Bureaucracy  0.015  0.011  0.013  0.013
(O  worst, I best)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.009)
Policy Distortion  -0.006***  -0.008*  **  -0.006***  -0.005**
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
Terms of Trade Changes  -0.020  0.013  -0.027  0.058
(0.042)  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.048)
Latin America Dummy  -0.017***  -0.030***  -0.016***  -0.020***
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  .-0.031  ***  -0.029***  -0.027***  -0.026***
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)
Socialist Dummy  l  -0.013***  -0.010*  -0.012*  -0.014*
l___  __  _  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)
Number of Observations  231  217  231  217
R-squared'  0.5602  0.5417  0.6161  0.562
*** significant  at 1%  level  **  significant  at 5% level  * significant  at 10%  level
' Standard  errors,  corrected  for heteroscedasticity,  are in parentheses.
b For all IV  regressions  in Table 12,  the instruments  for the following  variables  are the previous  five year lag of itself
and regional  and decade  dummy  variables:  policy  distortion;  and investment/GDP.  The  instrument  for  the
govemment  size  variable  is the prediction  form the govemment  size instrumental  variable  regression  reported  in
Table 11. All other  variables  in the regression  were  treated as exogenous.
'The  R-squared  is not an appropriate  measure  of goodness  of fit with instrumental  variable  regressions.
53generates  a  similarly  signed  coefficient,  as  does  the  policy  index  which  remains
negatively  signed  and  highly  significant.  These  estimations  with  identical  country
coverage  but  using different  deflators yield qualitatively  comparable  estimates, which
suggests that the relationships we have pinned down in the earlier part of the paper are
50 indeed robust
Finally, we have included  in each regression a set of regional dummy variables
following previous researchers 5  Like these studies, we find that some dummy variables
are highly significant, confirming the prior expectation that some regions have registered
surprisingly low or high values of the dependent variables (e.g., government size, growth,
infant  mortality  and  life  expectancy).  However,  as  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1995)
observe,  this  interpretation  of  the  estimated  coefficients  on  dummy  variables  is
problematic since the choice of regional dummy variables is endogenous.  Nevertheless,
the  presence of  significant regional  dummy  variables  poses  a  challenge;  we  need to
explain, for example, why Sub-Saharan Africa has a below average growth rate or East
Asia has a below average government size without resorting to the inclusion of dummy
variables for these regions.  We have taken care of this criticism in two ways.  First, we
re-estimated each regression without regional dummy variables and the results we get are
essentially  the  same,  albeit  with  a  lower  R-squared.  Second,  we  re-estimated  each
regression using the random effect technique with and without regional dummy variables.
50 Of course,  the growth  decomposition  can differ across  the two  data sets and  depend  as usual on point
estimates  and average  of each variable.  For example,  for low income  countries,  World  Bank  data tend
to overestimate  investmentlGDP,  and underestimate  per capita  GDP and government  consumption.
5  See, for example,  Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995) and Easterly  and Levine  (1996).
54Regional dummy variables were still  significant and the  results on  the remaining
variables  were essentially  the same in both sets of regressions  and similar to the reported
52 regression  results
8.  Conclusions
In this paper we have looked again at a set of issues that have long been at the
heart of economic  analysis;  nanely the factors  explaining  the size of govenmment  and the
consequences  of government  for growth, whether measured as income growth or other
attributes of well-being. These questions remain particularly pertinent given the sharp
growth in government  size in the last half-century  and the sharp disparity  in growth rates
that has characterised  the same period.
We assembled  a large cross-country  data set and pooled observations  across  three
decades.  Our results point  to a range of factors  driving size.  A robust association  between
government size and the level of income is not confirmed. Indeed, as technological
change shifts the demands on government, this would further tend to  dissipate the
mechanical  relationship  between  size and income.  We do find that relative  prices, the age
dependency  ratio, how long a country has been independent  and political freedom to be
important  explanatory  variables for growth of government.  Our findings are also partial
vindication of the argument  that governments  use their consumption  to buffer external
risk.  We find that in  low income countries govermnents use consumption more to
52 The re-estimated  regression  results  are available  upon request.
55stabilise income than in high income countries; the stabilisation effect is stronger, the
more open a country is and the more a country experiences  an adverse terms of trade
shock.
Turning  to the consequences  of government  for growth  in income  and well-being,
we find investment in physical and human capital to have positive growth effects. But
more importantly  we find a robust and significant  negative relationship  between growth
and government consumption,  whether measured in international  prices or in constant
dollars. But size is only one component  of government's  intervention.  Policy distortions
-- predictably  -- have a negative effect on growth but the quality of government  and its
bureaucracy  is shown to be positively  and significantly  linked to performance.  We show
that governments  with high quality of bureaucracy  and well-functioning  institutions  can
see these positive effects dominating  the independent  negative influence of size alone.
The simultaneous  interaction  between government  size and growth shows that, in low
income countries,  reduction  in risks brought  about by a larger government  comes at a cost
of a lower growth.
In addition,  social sector spending  is shown  to exert a positive  influence  on our
two well-being  indicators,  life expectancy  and infant mortality,  as do better  income
distribution,  higher per capita  income,  higher per capita income  growth  and more political
freedom.
56Figure 1
Sources of Per Capita  GDP Growth,  1964-1993a
(Deviation  from  World  Average)
OECD
Latin  America  and  ETotal Explained Catin  Ameribbeand  . Growth  Differential Caribbean  r
O Policy and Investment
South  Asia
EQuality of Bureaucracy
East  Asia and Pacific
- __  _Government Middle  East  and North  Comsumption
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Sub-Saharan  Africa  Schooling
-1.5  -1.0  -0.5  0.0  0.5  1.0  1.5  2.0
a~~~~~~~~~
a Based on IV regression in Table 6, column 4.  Each bar represents the contribution of each source to the deviation of growth of each region from the world
average.  Total explained growth differential is the sum of the four listed sources of growth, net of initial per capita GDP, population growth rate, the
interaction of government consumption and quality of bureaucracy, and terms of trade changes.
57Figure 2  Figure 3
Quality, policy distortion and growth  Quality, government consumption and growthb
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Number  of years  needed  to double  per capita  GDP
Panel A  Panel B
Policy  Distortion  Govermnent  Size
Quality  Low  High  Quality  Low  High
Low  50 years  165  years  Low  46 years  239  years
High  23 years  33 years  High  22 years  36 years
Based  on the IV regression  in Table  6, column  4.
bBased  on the IV regression  in Table 6, column  4.
58Appendix 1  Data: Description and Sources
Variable  Description  Source
Government Size  Log of (government consumption/GDP) in 1985 international prices  Summers & Heston,
PWT5.6
Log of (government consumption/GDP) in 1987 US dollars  World Bank
Per Capita GDP  Log of Per Capita GDP in 1985 international prices  Summers & Heston,
PWT5.6
Log of Per Capita GDP in 1987 dollars  World Bank
Relative Price of  Log of (Government consumption price deflator/Private consumption  Summers & Heston,
Government  price deflator) in 1985 international prices  PWT5.6
Consumption
Log of (Government consumption price deflator/Private consumption  World Bank
price deflator) in 1987 dollars
Per Capita GDP  Average annual growth of real GDP per capita in 1985 international  Summers & Heston,
Growth  prices  PWT5.6
Average annual growth of real GDP per capita in 1987 US dollars  World Bank
Age Dependency  Log of (Ratio of population of under 15 and over 64 to working age  World Bank
Ratio  population( 15-64))
Urbanization  Log of (urban population/total population)  World Bank
Openness  Log of (exports+imports/GDP) in current prices  World Bank
Terms of Trade  Average annual percentage changes in terms of trade  World Bank
Changes
Terms of Trade  Average annual percentage increases in terms of trade (set to 0 if  World Bank
Increases  negative)
Terms of Trade  Average annual percentage decreases in terms of trade (set to 0 if  World Bank
Decreases  positive)
Terms of Trade  Standard Deviation in the changes in terms of trade  World Bank
Volatility
Political Freedom  Gastil index of political freedom ranging from a high of I to a low of  Freedom House
7
Years Since  The percentage of years since 1776 the country has been independent  Easterly, W. and R.
Independence  Levine (1996)
59Variable  Description  Source
Initial Per Capita  Log of initial  per Capita  GDP  in 1985  international  prices  Summers  & Heston,
GDP  PWT5.6
Log of initial  per Capita  GDP in 1987  dollars  World  Bank
Population  Growth  Average  annual growth  rate of the population  World  Bank
Initial Schooling  Log  of the average  years of schooling  Nehru etal (1993) and
Barro and Lee (1994)
Investment/GDP  Log of real investment  over  GDP in 1985  international  prices  Summers  & Heston,
PWT5.6
Log of real  investment  over  GDP in 1987  US dollars  World  Bank
Black  Market  Log of (1I  +Black Market  Premium/100)  World Development
Premium  (BMP)  Report  (1991); Pick's
currency  Yearbook
(various  years); and
Barro  and Lee  (1994)
Price Level  of GDP  PPP adjusted  price level of GDP  used to measure  the distortion  Summers  & Heston,
between  domestic  and intemational  prices where  USA is equal  to I  PWT5.6
Policy  Distortion  Principal  component  of -I times  openness,  BMP and the absolute  See individual
value of the GDP  price deflator  minus 1. The index is constructed  components
using  principal  component  analysis  to find the unit-length  linear
combinations  of the three variables  with  the
greatest  variance. All variables  have been standardized  with  mean
zero and standard  deviation  of one. Higher  values indicate  a greater
distortion  in policy.
Quality  of  Composite  index based  on data from 1) Business  Environmental  Risk Knack  and Keefer
Bureaucracy  Intelligence  (BERI)  index of Bureaucratic  Delays, measuring  the  (1995); Mauro (1995)
"speed  and efficiency  of the civil service  including  processing
customs  clearances,  foreign  exchange
remittances  and similar  applications."  2) International  Country  Risk
Guide  (ICRG)  index  of Quality  of Bureaucracy  which  measures  the
general  efficiency  of government  bureaucracy. Specifically,  it
measures  whether  there is a "autonomy  from
political  pressure...  strength  and expertise  to govern  without  drastic
changes  in policy  or interruptions  in government  services." 3)
Business  International/Economist  Intelligence  Unit's  index of
Bureaucracy  and Red Tape. This index is a
60Variable  Description  Source
measure  of "the regulatory  environment  foreign  firms must face
when  seeking  approvals  and permits. The degree  to which  it
represents  an obstacle  to business."  Scores  of all indices  where
rescaled  to range from 0 (worst)  to 1  (best). Pairwise
correlations  of the variables  indicated  a high degree of correlation
among  variables  with values  ranging  form .76 to .88.
Infant Mortality  Log  of (Infant  (0-1) Mortality  rate-4)  with  4 being the lowest  infant  World  Bank
mortality  rate for any given country
Life Expectancy  -I *Log  of (80-Life  Expectancy)  with  80 being the maximum  average  World  Bank
life  expectancy  for any country
Social  Spending/GDP Log  of Nominal  Government  Expenditure  on Health  and Education  World  Bank
over  Nominal  GDP
Income  Inequality  Gini coefficient  for income  that can range from a low  of 0 to a high  Deininger  and Squire
of 100  (1996)
Federal  Dummy  Dummy  variable  equal  to I if country  is a federalist  state,  0 otherwise See  Easterly  and Levine
(1996)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  Dummy  variable  equal  to I if Sub-Saharan  African  country  by World World  Bank
Dummy  Bank  classification,  0 otherwise
Latin America  Dummy  variable equal  to I if country  in Latin  America  or Caribbean  World  Bank
Dummy  region  by World  Bank classification,  0 otherwise
East  Asia Dummy  Dummy  variable  equal to I if country  in East Asia and Pacific  region  World  Bank
by World  Bank classification,  0 otherwise
Socialist  Dummy  Dummy  variable equal  to I if socialist  economic  system,  0 otherwise  Kornai  (1992)
61Appendix 2  Regional  Composition  of Countries in OLS Regressions
Region  Number of countries
Sub-Saharan  Africa  42
Middle  East & North  Africa  9
East Asia & Pacific  16
South  Asia  5
Latin America  & Carrbbean  29
Eastern  Europe  and Central  Asia  9
High Income  OECD  22
Total  132
Sub-Saharan Africa  High Income OECD  Latin America & Caribbean
Angola*  Austria*  * *  Argentina**
Benin*  Australia*  Bahamas++
Botswana**  Belgium***  Barbados***
Burundi*  Canada***  Belize*
Cape  Verde*  Denmark***  Bolivia**
Cameroon***  France***  Brazil***
Central  African  Republic*  Finland***  Chile***
Comoros*  Germany***  Colombia***
Congo*  Iceland  Costa Rica***
Cote D'ivoire**  Ireland***  Dominican  Republic***
Djibouti*  Italy***  Ecuador**
Ethiopia**  Japan**  El Salvadore**
Gabon*  Luxembourg***  Guatemala**
Gambia**  Netherland**  Guyana***
Ghana**  New  Zealand*  Haiti**
Guinea*  Norway***  Honduras***
Guinea-Bissau**  Portugal***  Jamaica**
Kenya**  Spain***  Mexico***
Lesotho*  Sweden***  Nicaragua**
Liberia*  Switzerland**  Panama***
Madagascar"  United Kingdom***  Paraguay**
Mali**  United  States***  Peru***
Malawi**  St. Kitts & Nevis*
Mauritania*  St. Lucia*
Mauritius*  St. Vincent  & the Grenadines*
Namibia*  Suriname*








62Sub-Saharan Africa Continued  East Asia & Pacific  Middle East & North Africa
Sudan**  China*  Algeria**
Swaziland*  Figi*  Egypt***
Tanzania***  Hong Kong+  Iran***
Togo**  Indonesia***  Israel**
Uganda**  Laos*  Jordan**
Zaire**  Malaysia***  Morocco***
Zambia***  Myanmar+  Syria**
Zimbabwe***  Papua New Guinea*  Tunisia***
Philippines**  Yemen**
Singapore***
South Asia  Solomon Islands*
Bangladesh**  South Korea***  Eastern Europe and Central
India***  Thailand***  Bulgaria*
Nepal*  Tonga*  Cyprus**
Pakistan**  Vanuatu*  Greece**






- In Government Size Regression Only
-*  In Government Size and Per Capita GDP Growth Regressions Only
* In Government Size, Per Capita GDP Growth and Well-Being Regressions
+  In Per Capita GDP Growth Regression Only
-H  In Government Size and Well-Being Regressions Only
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